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Dr. Roberto Gutierrez
New equity shares are sold for raising capital via a primary seasoned equity offering
(SEO). In their 2010 article, Murray Carlson, Adlai Fisher, and Ron Giammarino
discovered an intriguing relationship between market volatility and primary SEOs, namely
that the volatility decreases before a primary SEO and increases thereafter. This pattern
contradicts the real options theory of equity issuance for investment. In this study, I
examine in greater detail whether the pre- and post-issue volatility dynamics are related
to the probability of issuing new equity. I find little evidence that the decision to conduct
a primary SEO depends on changes in market volatility after controlling for previously
recognized determinants of SEOs. This reconciles the volatility finding of Carlson et al.
with the real options theory of equity issuance for investment. I also examine secondary
SEOs, in which only existing equity shares are sold and therefore no capital is raised by
the firm. For secondary SEOs, real options theory makes no predictions about risk changes
around the events. I find that market volatility tends to decline before a secondary SEO, a
finding which warrants further attention.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since a monumental paper by Myers and Majluf (1984), enormous attention has been
paid over recent decades to uncover key economic determinants of public equity issuance,
namely initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). As surveyed
by Ritter (2003), Baker et al. (2007), and Eckbo et al. (2007), financial economists broadly
agree that equity offerings are motivated by capital demands, information asymmetry,
liquidity, and investor sentiment, none of which is mutually exclusive in explaining public
equity offerings.
A recent paper by Carlson et al. (2010) provides a new finding that market volatility
is apparently decreasing before the issuance of a primary SEO and increasing thereafter.
In primary SEOs, new equity shares are sold to raise capital to exercise the firm’s growth
options. Largely motivated by the volatility finding of Carlson et al. (2010), this paper starts
with a rigorous statistical test to examine if the volatility dynamics prior to issuance are
statistically significant. The findings are intriguing. Although it is decreasing on average,
market volatility before a primary SEO is not statistically decreasing. In contrast, I find
that market volatility significantly decreases prior to secondary SEOs, an event in which
current shareholders sell large blocks of equity and capital is not raised by the firm.
Focusing on the possibility that market volatility is a new determinant of public equity
issuance, I further examine whether or not the pre- and post-issue volatility dynamics are
related to an issuance decision after controlling for previously recognized determinants
of SEOs. For this task, I rely on a test procedure utilizing aggregate issuance volume
rather than an unobservable firm-level issuance probability. Considering a lead-lag relation
among variables in a system of equations and a potential multicollinearity problem via an
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underfitting analysis and a principal component analysis, I find that the change in market
volatility before issuance is negatively related to the issuance probability of a secondary
SEO. In contrast, I do not find the same evidence for primary SEOs. Finally, I find little
evidence that either primary or secondary SEOs is associated with a post-issue increase in
market volatility.
The findings of this paper contribute to the finance literature in the following two
ways. First, no relation between market volatility and primary offerings reconciles the
volatility finding of Carlson et al. (2010) with the real options theory of primary SEOs
in Carlson et al. (2006). In their 2010 paper, the authors improve the real option-based
model of primary SEOs in Carlson et al. (2006) by augmenting commitment-to-invest, and
find that beta dynamics of primary SEO-conducting firms are consistent with the model
predictions; on average, beta is increasing prior to issuance and decreasing thereafter. At
the same time, however, they observe that the market volatility dynamics displayed by
primary SEO-conducting firms appear to contradict the risk dynamics of primary SEOs.1
They interpret that a pre-issue decrease in market volatility is indicative of the volatility
timing of primary SEOs–more primary SEOs are made at times of low market volatility. In
this paper, I find that the issuance probability of a primary SEO is not statistically related
to the changes in pre- or post-issue market volatility, meaning that the decision to make a
primary SEO is not affected by the volatility dynamics.
Next, the significant pattern of decreasing market volatility prior to secondary SEOs
is interesting, in that real options theory makes no predictions about risk changes for a
public equity issuance that does not raise capital. I find that pre-issue market volatility
seems to dominate other well-known determinants of secondary SEOs, such as information
1Carlson et al. (2010) offer several potential explanations for the volatility dynamics around the issuance
of a primary SEO. One, firms might prefer to raise capital when certainty about proceeds is greater. Two, the
option value of waiting to invest is lower when volatility is lower. Three, additional investment commitments
might serve to increase future growth options and induce higher post-SEO volatility.
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asymmetry, liquidity, and investor sentiment, none of which remains significant when the
change in pre-issue market volatility is considered as an additional determinant. As pointed
out by Kim and Weisbach (2008), little attention has been paid to secondary offerings and
our understanding is fairly limited, even though a significant number of offerings conducted
by the U.S. firms are classified as secondary offerings.2 Given this limited understanding
of the secondary offerings, the volatility dynamics displayed by secondary SEO-issuing
firms in relation to the issuance probability deserve scholarly attention. Considering that
no theory is available, I declare the documented dynamics of pre-issue volatility in events
of secondary SEOs as puzzling.
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the data set used in this
paper and provides summary statistics. In chapter 3, I reproduce and extend the volatility
dynamics first observed by Carlson et al. (2010). Chapter 4 consists of an empirical
analysis on a relation between an issuance probability and recent changes in market
volatility around SEOs, along with other potential determinants affecting an issuance
decision. Finally, chapter 5 concludes.
2For instance, I find that secondary offerings account for almost 20% of all SEOs conducted by the U.S.
firms over the period 1970 – 2005. Heron and Lie (2005) and Kim and Weisbach (2008) report the proportion
of secondary SEOs in the U.S. is 15.7% over the period 1980 – 1998 and 13.8% over the period 1990 – 2003
respectively.
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CHAPTER II
DATA
I collect SEO samples from Thomson Financial’s SDC database. Starting with a
population of SEOs that have been conducted by the U.S. firms over the period 1970 –
2005, I match each issuer’s six-digit CUSIP in Thomson Financial’s SDC database with
CUSIP Issuer Number in the CRSP CUSIP master file and then eliminate SEOs that are
not found in the master file. Following the conventions of previous studies, I exclude (a)
ADRs, ADSs, and GDRs, (b) SEOs without SDC information on offering prices, (c) SEOs
in which offering prices are less than $5, (d) simultaneous offerings of debt and equity,
and (e) simultaneous offerings to domestic and foreign markets. Throughout the paper, I
define primary SEOs as SEOs consisting of 100% new shares and secondary SEO as SEOs
consisting of 100% existing shares.1 These selection procedures leave 7,313 primary SEOs
and 1,831 secondary SEOs for a main empirical analysis.
Panel A of Table 2.1. provides summary statistics of 9,144 SEOs constructed above.
According to Panel A, a greater amount of proceeds (in constant 2000 dollars) is raised in
the form of secondary SEOs than primary SEOs, where proceeds in each year are adjusted
to real 2000 dollars using consumer price index. Compared with those of primary SEOs,
large standard deviations indicate that secondary SEOs are characterized with the extreme
values of proceeds and the number of shares offered to the public. Overall, Panel A is
1Depending on the purpose of proceeds from equity offerings, firms sell new equity in the form of primary
offerings in which raised capital is retained to initiate new profitable projects, or sell existing shares via
secondary offerings for liquidating the positions of a group of shareholders, often including insiders–for
instance, CEOs, directors and officers (D&O), and presidents or founders–in open transactions [see, e.g.,
Kim and Weisbach (2008)]. According to an early study by Mikkelson and Partch (1984), for instance, the
secondary offerings featured with large block sales of common stock are approved by the exchange on the
judgment that the blocks cannot be absorbed in the normal course of trading, and distinctly differ from the
primary offerings by their innocent effects on capital structure.
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TABLE 2.1.: Summary Statistics and Jensen’s Alphas
Panel A shows the means, medians, and standard deviations of total proceeds and total
shares of SEOs that have been conducted by the U.S. firms over the period 1970 – 2005.
Panel B computes Jensen’s alphas from the Fama-French factor model by running rpt −
r f t =α+β1MKTt+β2SMBt+β3HMLt+et , where rpt is the monthly return on a calendar-
time EW portfolio consisting of firms that have issued SEOs in the past 36 months and r f t is
the one-month T-bill rate. See Fama and French (1992, 1993) for the definitions of MKTt ,
SMBt , and HMLt . The t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Panel A. Summary Statistics
Total proceeds (in millions) Total shares (in thousands)
N Median Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev
Primary SEOs 7,313 47.12 84.76 137.07 1,600 2,836 5,257.75
Secondary SEOs 1,831 44.18 94.73 176.74 950 2,818 6,538.61
Panel B. Jensen’s alphas
N α(%) t-statistic R2
Primary SEOs 4,509 -0.39 -3.74 0.87
Secondary SEOs 1,444 -0.08 -0.75 0.89
consistent with a general notion that the wealth effect of secondary SEOs would be huge
on a small group of stakeholders selling their own shares for a liquidation purpose.2
I further exclude (f) unit offerings, (g) offerings without CRSP PERMCO, (h)
offerings not listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, (i) offerings having no returns on the
CRSP monthly return files during the three year period after issuance, and (j) offerings
not having CRSP share code of either 10 or 11. This filtering leaves 4,509 primary SEOs
and 1,444 secondary SEOs respectively. Then, I estimate Jensen’s alphas of the Fama-
French three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and evaluate three-year post-issue
2The impact of selling existing shares on the personal wealth of stakeholders in a secondary SEO is
documented in other papers. According to Clarke et al. (2004), for instance, the number of secondary shares
offered to the public as a fraction of shares outstanding averages 18% for the sample of secondary SEOs
conducted over the period of 1980 – 1996. Since the market capitalization of secondary SEO-conducting
firms averages $931.36 million over the sample period, secondary SEOs shall increase the post-issue wealth
of stakeholders by $167.64 million on average.
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performance of these 5,953 SEOs. Monthly returns on SEO-issuing firms and the Fama-
French factors are obtained from the CRSP.
Following Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the dependent variables in
the factor regressions are the monthly returns on a calendar-time EW portfolio of firms
that have issued SEOs in the past 36 months. The use of a calendar-time portfolio is
recommended by many long-run event studies [see, e.g., Kothari and Warner (2007)].
For instance, the cross-correlation induced by buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs)
would incorrectly overestimate t-statistics of Jensen’s alphas, or equivalently speaking,
overemphasize a managerial ability to sell overvalued equity [see, e.g., Brav et al. (2000)].
In addition, Schultz (2003) advocates the use of a calendar-time portfolio for reducing a
problem associated with pseudo market timing stating that post-issue underperformance
has nothing to do with a true market timing ability.
Panel B of Table 2.1. reports Jensen’s alphas of the Fama-French three-factor model
along with the t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity. In Panel B, the abnormal
performance over the three-year period after issuance largely replicates the findings of
previous studies. The EW alpha for primary SEOs is equal to -0.39% (t = −3.74) per
month, which is similar in magnitude to -0.37% in Brav et al. (2000) and -0.35% in
Lyandres et al. (2007), and implies that new shares are sold at their overvalued prices,
as asserted by the theory of windows-of-opportunity [see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995,
2000), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Cornett et al. (1998), Rangan (1998), Teoh et al.
(1998)].3 By contrast, secondary SEOs are not followed by post-issue underperformance;
Jensen’s alpha is -0.08% (t =−0.75). This is consistent with the finding of Lee (1997) who
3Financial economists standing on rational pricing theory negate the post-issue underperformance by
mentioning (a) a bad model problem [Fama (1998)], (b) problematic statistical inferences due to the cross-
correlation of issuance events [Brav et al. (2000) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000)], (c) error-in-risk
adjustments [Eckbo et al. (2000), Carlson et al. (2006), Lyandres et al. (2007), Li et al. (2009)], and
(d) pseudo market timing [Schultz (2003), Butler et al. (2005)].
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makes the same conclusion on a basis of BHARs. Overall, the SEO sample of this paper
well replicates the previous findings that primary shares are sold at their overvalued prices,
while secondary shares are not.
As the last summary statistics, I compute size and book-to-market in the way
advocated by Fama and French (1992, 1993) using accounting information on SEO issuers
from the COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial Files. First, I define size as the share price
times the number of shares outstanding in June. Book common equity (BE) is defined
as stockholder’s equity (SEQ), minus preferred stock, plus balance-sheet deferred taxes
and investment tax credit if available, minus core post retirement adjustment if available,
where the preferred stock is defined as preferred stock liquidating value, preferred stock
redemption value, or preferred stock par value (PSTK). Missing SEQ is replaced with
common equity (CEQ), plus PSTK. When either CEQ or PSTK is missing, SEQ is
estimated as book assets, minus liabilities. I drop negative BE firms. Finally, market
common equity is defined as the share price times the number of shares outstanding in
December.
In Table 2.2., SEO issuers are sorted across size and book-to-market quintiles by
the benchmark size and book-to-market breakpoints obtained from Kenneth French’s Web
site.4 Following Lyandres et al. (2007), I assign issuers in the period from July of year T to
June of year T +1 to quintiles at the fiscal year ending in calendar year T −1. If either size
or book-to-market at issue year T is missing, I replace them with the corresponding values
observed in year T +1. As a result, 4,541 primary SEOs and 1,220 secondary SEOs have
valid COMPUSTAT information on size and book-to-market at issue year. The frequency
distribution of SEO issuers in Table 2.2. is consistent with the previous finding that small-
growth firms are likely to conduct primary SEOs. Consistent with the IPO finding of
4I appreciate Kenneth French for providing the data.
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TABLE 2.2.: Frequency Distribution of SEO Issuers
SEO-issuing firms are assigned across size and book-to-market quintiles in the way
advocated by Lyandres at al. (2007). The frequency distribution of 4,541 primary SEOs
and that of 1,220 secondary SEOs are reported in Panels A and B respectively.
Panel A. Primary SEOs
SMALL 2 3 4 BIG ALL
LOW 16.12 5.24 2.44 1.48 1.08 26.36
2 7.27 3.88 3.44 2.11 1.23 17.93
3 6.96 4.47 3.77 2.25 1.19 18.64
4 8.63 4.58 3.08 2.77 2.38 21.44
HIGH 7.84 2.47 2.11 1.76 1.45 15.63
ALL 46.82 20.64 14.84 10.37 7.33 100.00
Panel B. Secondary SEOs
SMALL 2 3 4 BIG ALL
LOW 9.02 9.10 7.95 5.57 5.08 36.72
2 6.80 5.16 4.18 3.52 3.52 23.18
3 3.85 3.20 2.21 3.11 2.87 15.24
4 3.85 3.85 1.48 1.56 1.64 12.38
HIGH 5.66 1.80 2.05 1.80 1.15 12.46
ALL 29.18 23.11 17.87 15.56 14.26 100.00
Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2005), I also observe that secondary SEO-issuing firms are
growth-oriented.
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CHAPTER III
EXTENSION OF CARLSON ET AL. (2010)
This chapter reproduces and extends the dynamics of market volatility surrounding
events of SEOs, which is originally documented by Carlson et al. (2010).
Following Schwert (1989), I estimate market volatility in month τ as the standard
deviation of returns on a CRSP daily value-weighting (VW) market index in month τ . For
each SEO j that has been conducted in month τ0 over the period January 1970 – December
2005, I construct a time-series of market volatility for a 73-month period centered on the
issue month and denote it by VOL j,τ for τ ∈ [τ0−36,τ0+36] and j = 1, . . . ,9,144. Using
these series of VOL j,τ , I further construct a time-series of event-time EW averages, denoted
by VOLτ , for 7,313 primary and 1,831 secondary SEOs respectively. By construction,
VOLτ represents the average market volatility in month τ with which an issuer may
encounter when she is randomly drawn from a population of observed issuers over the
period January 1970 – December 2005 with an equal probability.
For a purpose of extension, I define a high-volume month of primary SEOs as month
τ in which
Mτ−1+Mτ +Mτ+1
3
> Q3
where Mτ is the number of primary SEOs conducted in month τ and Q3 is the upper
quartile across three-month centered moving averages of primary SEOs over the period
from January 1970 to December 2005, as suggested by Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996).
Similarly, a low-volume month is defined as the month in which its three-month centered
moving average falls below the lower quartile. For secondary SEOs, I repeat the same
procedures, and then define high- versus low-secondary SEO volume months.
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One may think that dynamics of VOLτ in high- versus low-SEO volume periods would
represent the evolution of VOLτ in the periods of high versus low issuance probability.
To see it, suppose first that Zt individual firms consider a SEO and make their issuance
decisions independently in time t.1 Let a random variable Yi,t+1 be equal to 1 if firm i
conducts a SEO at time t+1 with issuance probability of pi,t+1 and 0 otherwise. Then, the
observed number of firms conducting a SEO at time t+ 1, or equivalently speaking, SEO
volume at time t + 1, denoted by Nt+1, is equal to ∑Zti=1Yi,t+1. After taking expectation
in both sides, I write that E[Nt+1] = ∑Zti=1 pi,t+1. Assuming further that Zt is constant
over time, one sees that high-SEO volume periods correspond to the periods with high
cross-sectional mean of pi,t+1, while low-SEO volume periods are featured with low cross-
sectional mean of pi,t+1.2 Thus, the volatility dynamics in high- versus low-SEO volume
periods would describe the pre- and post-issue evolutions of market volatility in the regime
of high issuance probability versus of low issuance probability.
Figure 3.1. plots VOLτ displayed by primary SEOs (depicted in solid lines) and that
by secondary SEOs (depicted in dotted lines). In the periods of high SEO volume, Panel
A shows that VOLτ is decreasing prior to issuance and attains its minimum at the month
of issuance in events of both primary and secondary SEOs. Interestingly, the opposite
is observed in the periods of low SEO volume; both primary and secondary SEOs are
preceded by increasing VOLτ in Panel B. As a result, Panels A and B conclude that the
cross-sectional average of issuance probabilities could be negatively related to the pre-issue
1Independent issuance decisions can be consistent with SEO waves, in that firm’s decision is determined
by firm-specific factors as well as market-wide common factors. By decomposing a firm-specific profitability
shock into a systematic shock and an idiosyncratic shock, for instance, Pastor and Veronesi (2005) show
that the systematic shock triggered by shocks to market-wide common factors shall lead to IPO waves,
or equivalently speaking, a clustering of going public, although each firm makes an issuance decision
independently on a basis of individual firm-level profitability.
2Denote high- and low-SEO volume by E[NHIGHt+1 ] and E[N
LOW
t+1 ] respectively. Then, E[N
HIGH
t+1 ]> E[N
LOW
t+1 ]
implies that ∑Zi=1 pHIGHi,t+1 > ∑
Z
i=1 p
LOW
i,t+1, where p
HIGH
i,t+1 and p
LOW
i,t+1 represents the issuance probabilities in high-
and low-SEO volume periods respectively. The assumption of constant Zt shall be relaxed in chapter 4.
10
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
0.
00
70
0.
00
75
0.
00
80
0.
00
85
0.
00
90
0.
00
95
0.
01
00
Panel A. HIGH
VO
L
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
0.
00
75
0.
00
80
0.
00
85
0.
00
90
0.
00
95
0.
01
00
0.
01
05
Panel B. LOW
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
0.
00
75
0.
00
80
0.
00
85
0.
00
90
Panel C. ALL
FIGURE 3.1.: Event-time EW Averages of Market Volatility
Panel A reports VOLτ over the 73-month period centered on issue month in high-SEO
volume periods. Those in low- and all-SEO volume periods are reported in Panels B and
C respectively. VOLτ displayed by primary and secondary SEOs are depicted in solid and
dotted lines respectively.
change in market volatility–that is to say, an issuance probability is high when pre-issue
market volatility has decreased, but is low when pre-issue market volatility has increased.
In addition, Figure 3.1. shows that the pre-issue dynamics of VOLτ would differ by
offering types. An informal eye-ball test of Panel C that is a reproduction of the volatility
finding of Carlson et al. (2010), for instance, reveals that secondary SEOs are on average
preceded by a greater change in VOLτ relative to primary SEOs. For testing formally if
the pre-issue dynamics of VOLτ differs by offering types, I focus on a linear trend in a
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time-series of VOLτ , denoted by γ , over the 24-month period prior to issuance. According
to Eckbo et al. (2007), the average number of years between the IPO offer date and the
SEO as the first post-IPO security offering is 2.31 years. Although no theory predicts
an appropriate length of the time interval for this test, I choose the 24-month period by
interpreting Eckbo et al. (2007) as evidence that it takes 2.31 years on average for firms to
time an equity offering in accordance with changes in market volatility.
In order to test for the null that the linear trend is zero, I perform the Wald-type test of
Vogelsang (1998) based on a model
yτ = µ+ γτ+uτ ,
where yτ = VOLτ , uτ = αuτ−1 + d(L)eτ , d(L) = ∑∞i=0 diLi, and eτ ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2e ). In the
presence of general forms of serial correlation, Vogelsang (1998) proposes the Wald-type
statistics of t−PS1T and t−PS2T , and claims that t−PS1T has more power but t−PS2T is
more robust to a fractionally integrated process. I employ both t −PS1T and t −PS2T to
construct a 90% confidence interval for γ throughout the paper.3
Table 3.1. demonstrates that the pre-issue dynamics of VOLτ statistically differs by
the type of shared offered to the public. For instance, columns (1) and (2) of Panel A show
that γˆ in primary SEOs is significant at a 10% level in low-SEO volume periods alone. In
secondary SEOs, however, the corresponding columns of Panel B find that γˆ is significantly
negative in the periods of high issuance probability as well as significantly positive in the
periods of low issuance probability at a 10% level. Column (3) makes a similar conclusion
that, on average, a pre-issue change in VOLτ is significantly negative in events of secondary
3Vogelsang (1998) uses 90% confidence intervals for testing a deterministic linear trend. Several finance
papers performing the Vogelsang test follow this convention of adopting 90% confidence intervals [See, e.g.,
Campbell et al. (2001), Xu and Malkiel (2003), Bekaert et al. (2009)].
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TABLE 3.1.: Vogelsang Tests
This table performs the Vogelsang tests for H0 : γ = 0 by running yτ = µ+ γτ+uτ , where
yτ = VOLτ over 24 months before issuance, uτ = αuτ−1 + d(L)eτ , d(L) = ∑∞i=0 diLi, and
eτ ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2e ). I use both t −PS1T and t −PS2T to construct 90% confidence intervals
for γ , where t − PSiT is defined as T−1(Rβ ∗)
′ [
R(X
′
X)−1R′
]−1
(Rβ ∗)/
(
s2zexp(bJ
i
T (m))
)
for i= 1 and 2. Parameters for computing JiT (m) are available on Table II(i) of Vogelsang
(1998).
(1) HIGH (2) LOW (3) ALL
Panel A. Primary SEOs
γˆ(×104) 0.00 0.44 -0.05
t−PS1T [-0.42, 0.42] [0.04, 0.84] [-0.15, 0.05]
t−PS2T [-0.35, 0.35] [0.12, 0.75] [-0.13, 0.03]
N 3,153 749 7,313
Panel B. Secondary SEOs
γˆ(×104) -0.91 0.51 -0.44
t−PS1T [-1.15, -0.68] [0.28, 0.74] [-0.55, -0.33]
t−PS2T [-1.14, -0.68] [0.32, 0.70] [-0.53, -0.35]
N 1,029 71 1,831
SEOs but not of primary SEOs. Overall, Table 3.1. concludes that the volatility timing, or
equivalently speaking, a relation between an issuance probability and a pre-issue change in
market volatility would be prevalent when making a secondary SEO rather than making a
primary SEO. I shall further examine it in chapter 4.
Equally importantly, column (3) of Table 3.1. seems to refute the volatility-timing
puzzle of Carlson et al. (2010) who graphically illustrate that on average an event-time EW
average of market volatility or VOLτ is decreasing prior to issuance in events of primary
SEOs.4 In their paper, the authors improve an original real option-based model of primary
4As noted earlier in this paper, Carlson et al. (2010) also find that market volatility has increased after
issuance. While Table 3.1. refers to the first half, chapter 4 shall examine the last half of the volatility finding
of Carlson et al. (2010) in terms of the Granger-causality of equity issuance for predicting future market
volatility.
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SEOs in Carlson et al. (2006) by augmenting commitment-to-invest, and predict that the
risk of primary SEO-conducting firms shall be increasing prior to issuance, in that growth
options generate riskier cash flows than existing assets-in-place up to the moment when the
options are exercised by means of primary SEOs. As an empirical exercise, Carlson et al.
(2010) estimate time-varying betas of the conditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
by running short-window regressions, as originally implemented in Lewellen and Nagel
(2006), and find that, on average, the beta is increasing prior to issuance, which is consistent
with the model prediction. As recognized by the authors, however, the decreasing market
volatility dynamics displayed by primary SEO-conducting firms apparently contradicts the
SEO risk dynamics implied by real options theory.
In column (3) of Table 3.1., I find that γˆ for primary SEOs is insignificantly different
from zero at a 10% level. As long as an issuer attempts to time a primary offering with
respect to decreasing market volatility over 24 months prior to issuance, as presumed in
this paper, this insignificant γˆ suggests that the claimed volatility-timing puzzle by Carlson
et al. (2010) could be statistically suspicious to some degree. Along with it, chapter 4 shall
provide additional evidence showing that the issuance decision of a primary SEO is not
related to the dynamics of market volatility around events. Therefore, I conclude that the
volatility dynamics prior to the primary SEO events is not statistically significant enough
to be recognized as the puzzling evidence from the perspective of primary SEO-conducting
firm’s risk dynamics implied by real options theory.
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CHAPTER IV
VOLATILITY TIMING
Chapter 3 gives one an interesting finding that, if it is present, the volatility timing
would be more prevalent in selling secondary shares via SEOs. In this chapter, I rigorously
examine whether or not an issuance probability is related to the pre- and post-issue
dynamics of market volatility, along with other determinants that are presumably related
to the motivation behind public equity issuance. In section 4.1, I describe a general test
procedure for timing market-wide components in equity issuance. Section 4.2 examines
if SEO volume is stationary, which is a critical assumption underlying the test procedures.
Later, I construct several empirical proxies reflecting the motivation behind equity issuance
in section 4.3. Finally, section 4.4 provides empirical results concerning the volatility
timing.
4.1. Test Specification
I follow Pastor and Veronesi (2005) and assume that an issuance decision is made
on a basis of the changes in explanatory variables rather than the levels of those, or
equivalently speaking, an issuer makes an offering in accordance with recent changes in
market conditions rather than cumulative market conditions.1 Thus, I propose the following
predictive model
pi,t+1 = αi+β
′
i∆ f
M
t , (Equation 4.1.)
1Pastor and Veronesi (2005) provide the theoretical argument on the endogeneity of IPO timing, and
predict that a going-public decision shall be related to recent improvements in market conditions since the
option to wait becomes less valuable to delay an IPO as market conditions improves. The authors find an
empirical support that, for instance, a collective action of going public is critically related to recent market
returns, but is unrelated to the level of the aggregate M/B ratio.
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where pi,t+1 represents a probability that firm i issues public equity in time t + 1, ∆
represents the first difference, and fMt represents a k× 1 vector of market-wide factors
that are discussed by the previous literature as potential economic determinants affecting
pi,t+1.
It would be ideal to directly measure the unobservable firm-level issuance probability
pi,t+1 for each firm i in a set of all potential Zt issuers and then regress pi,t+1 on explanatory
variables. Although it is appealing, the empirical implementation this way is challenging
since the unobservable pi,t+1 is hard to measure correctly. In their logit regressions, for
instance, DeAngelo et al. (2010) use the dependent variable that equals one if a firm
conducts a SEO in a given year and zero otherwise, and treat it as a proxy for pi,t+1. It
should be noted that their logit regressions are possibly subject to a sample selection bias
that is induced by incidental truncation–that is to say, their SEO sample does not represent
all potential Zt issuers considering SEOs, but instead include only observed firms that have
been conducted SEOs for a given sample period.
I use aggregate SEO volume or Nt to avoid this empirical challenge relating to the
hardship of measuring pi,t+1 correctly. Given that Nt is persistent but stationary, as shall
be shown later, I assume that Nt follows the autoregressive (AR) model of order l, and
thus write that Nt − µ = φ1(Nt−1− µ)+ · · ·+ φl(Nt−l − µ)+ηt , where µ = E[Nt ] and ηt
is a white noise. Invoking a property of the Bernoulli distribution, then, one can write the
following regression specification
Nt+1 = A0+β ′(Zt∆ fMt )+
l
∑
k=1
φkNt−k+1+ηt , (Equation 4.2.)
where A0 ≡ ∑Zti=1αi+ µ∑lk=1φk. See Appendix for details. Importantly, Equation 4.2.
states that a relationship of SEO volume with the changes in market-wide determinants,
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multiplied by Zt , effectively reflects a cross-sectional average of firm-specific β
′
i or a firm-
specific relationship between pi,t+1 and ∆ fMt in Equation 4.1..
Previous studies point out the complex interaction and feedback among variables in
Equation 4.2., so that running a single equation without accounting for such complex
relations would result in inefficient estimates. For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2000)
find that current aggregate issuance activity is negatively related to a future market return.
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) find that current IPO volume is positively related to a lagged
market return, but is negatively related to lagged market volatility and a future market
return. As a result, these complex lead-lag relations shall be investigated in the analysis of
simultaneous-equations models instead of running the single regression.
For the efficiency gain, I use a following vector autoregressive (VAR) model
yt = c+Φ1yt−1+Φ2yt−2+ . . .+Φpyt−p+ εt , (Equation 4.3.)
where yt = (nt ,∆ fˆMt )
′
, nt is defined as ln(N∗t ), N∗t = max{Nt ,0.5}, ∆ fˆMt is defined
as Zt∆ fMt , and εt ∼ i.i.d.(0,Ω). Throughout the paper, the lag length of p shall be
selected using Schwart-Bayesian (BIC) information criterion. There are a few remarks
on implementing Equation 4.3.. First, I treat A0 in Equation 4.2. as a constant c in Equation
4.3. for simplicity. Unreported results show that the main findings of this paper remain
unchanged when c is specified as seasoned dummy variables alternatively. Instead of a
raw series of Nt , I use nt for suppressing excessive fluctuations of SEO volume which
could cause a so-called regression phenomenon. The same treatment is found in Dahlquist
and de Jong (2008) applying the log transformation to monthly IPO volume. Finally, Zt
is computed as the number of CRSP-listed firms used in computing a CRSP VW market
index. Following Lowry (2003), I use the actual number of public firms as estimates of
Zt from January 1973 to December 2005, but estimate Zt from January 1970 to December
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1972 by assuming that the actual number of public firms grows at the rate of 0.045% per
month.
4.2. Stationary Test
For implementing the VAR model specified in Equation 4.3., I first construct two
time-series of quarterly SEO volume using 7,313 primary SEOs, denoted by {NP,t}144t=1, and
1,831 secondary SEOs, denoted by
{
NS,t
}144
t=1, both of which have been conducted from the
period 1Q 1970 – 4Q 2005.
The construction of SEO volume series at a quarterly frequency is conventional [see,
e.g., Lowry (2003) and Pastor and Veronesi (2005)]. I follow this convention, in that a
monthly time-series of secondary SEO volume contains too many zeros; secondary SEOs
have not been made for a total of 45 months over the sample period. The frequent presence
of such months with no offerings shall cause a problem with using a simple VAR model
because a desirable asymptotic property is hardly achievable in a finite sample. One remedy
would be obtained by explicitly specifying a stochastic process of monthly SEO volume
via, for instance, a Poisson process [see, e.g., Dahlquist and de Jong (2008)]. In the
context of a system of equations, however, this approach brings forth a significant burden
of computation, which is simply beyond the scope of this paper.
Since the main assumption underlying Equation 4.2. is the stationarity of a SEO
volume series, I check whether a time-series of {Nt} is stationary or nonstationary. For this
task, one might simply perform the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for H0 : {Nt} ∼
I(1).2 However, the sample autocorrelation function of {Nt} verifies that the SEO volume is
highly persistent, and thus this persistency could make the use of the ADF test problematic
2In her study of IPO volume fluctuations, Lowry (2003) performs the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and
concludes that persistent IPO volume is nonstationary.
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since the ADF test is known to have very low power against the I(0) alternatives that are
close to being I(1). Accounting for the persistence and achieving the maximum power
against the local-to-unit alternative, I instead perform the so-called DF-GLS test proposed
by Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996). Formally speaking, I test H0 : pi = 0 by running a
regression that
∆Ndt = piN
d
t−1+
k
∑
j=1
pi j∆Ndt− j+ et ,
where Ndt = Nt − ψˆ ′Dt , ψˆ = argminψ ∑(Nα¯t −ψ
′
Dt)2, and α¯ = 1+ c¯/144. By setting Dt
equal to one and c¯ equal to minus seven, I intend to test the null that Nt ∼ I(1) without drift
against the alternative that Nt ∼ I(0) with nonzero mean since no obvious linear trends are
observed in both series of {NP,t}144t=1 and
{
NS,t
}144
t=1. Following Ng and Perron (2001) for
size improvement, furthermore, I select k as k∗ = argmink≤kmaxMAIC(k), where MAIC is
the modified Akaike information criterion.
Table 4.1. performs the DF-GLS tests. For both SEO volume series, H0 : pi = 0 is
rejected at a 5% level. Thus, it concludes that SEO volume is persistent but stationary,
which is consistent with the previous findings of Viswanathan and Wei (2008) and
Dahlquist and de Jong (2008).3 As a result, this stationarity of quarterly SEO volume
justifies the transition to Equation 4.2.. In an empirical analysis followed on, I shall employ
nP,t and nS,t , where nP,t and nS,t are defined as ln(N∗P,t) and ln(N∗S,t) respectively. Table 4.1.
verifies that the DF-GLS tests for the stationarity of {nt} also reject the null of unit root at
a 5% level in both primary and secondary SEOs.
3Viswanathan and Wei (2008) make the same conclusion that the DF-GLS test rejects the null of a unit
root in monthly SEO volume. They also reject the null of a unit root in monthly IPO volume at a 5% level.
Dahlquist and de Jong (2008) find that a unit root hypothesis of monthly IPO volume is rejected under the
ADF test and a stationarity hypothesis of monthly IPO volume is not rejected under the KPSS test.
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TABLE 4.1.: DF-GLS Tests
This table performs the DF-GLS test by running ∆ydt = piydt−1+∑
k
j=1pi j∆ydt− j+ et , where
y = {Nt ,nt}, Nt is the number of SEOs in quarter t over the period from 1Q 1970 to
4Q 2005, nt = ln(N∗t ), N∗t = max{Nt ,0.5}, ydt = yt − ψˆ , ψˆ = argminψ ∑(yα¯t −ψ)2, and
α¯ = 1− 7/144. For implementing the tests, k is selected as k∗ = argmink≤kmaxMAIC(k),
where MAIC is the modified Akaike information criterion of Ng and Perron (2001). The
t-statistics for testing H0 : pi = 0 are reported in parentheses. The critical values are -2.58
at 1%, -1.95 at 5%, and -1.61 at 10%.
Nt nt
Offering Type k pˆi R2 k pˆi R2
Primary SEOs 10 -0.29 0.32 12 -0.33 0.37
(-3.00) (-3.34)
Secondary SEOs 1 -0.15 0.13 8 -0.15 0.26
(-2.93) (-2.31)
4.3. Empirical Proxies
As a variable of main interest, market volatility or VOLt is computed as the quarterly
variance of CRSP daily VW market index returns in quarter t. Along with VOL, I
include several proxies for capital demands, information asymmetry, liquidity, and investor
sentiment in a vector of market-wide component fMt , none of which is mutually exclusive
in explaining SEO decisions.
First, it is well known that primary SEOs are preceded by price run-up. Among
others, for instance, Choe et al. (1993) find that more offerings are made in expansionary
phases of the business cycle at which market returns tend to increase. Given this well-
documented price run-up, I compute the market return, denoted by RETt , by compounding
CRSP daily VW market index returns over quarter t, and include it in the vector yt .
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) explain why primary IPO waves are preceded by increasing
market returns, in that greater capital demands, induced by decreasing expected market
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risk premium, lead to more primary offerings. Thus, the capital demand story predicts that
RET shall be positively related to the issuance probability of a primary offering. At the
same time, however, it should be noted that RET can be influenced by investor sentiment.
This implies that the relation of an issuance probability with pre-issue market returns has
dual interpretations; SEOs are motivated for the price run-up that reflects either increasing
capital demands or increasing investor sentiment.
In semi-strong form efficient, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Lucas and McDonald
(1990) hypothesize that information asymmetry induces the adverse-selection costs of
issuing equity and, as a result, predict that more firms will conduct equity offerings when
information asymmetry is low. Follow-on studies provide empirical support for it. With the
notion of time-varying adverse-selection costs, for instance, Korajczyk et al. (1991) find
that firms prefer to issue equity just after credible information has released via earnings
announcements. According to Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), the negative announcement
effect is lower in magnitude in high SEO volume periods than in low SEO volume
periods, which is suggestive of a negative relationship between an issuance probability
and market-wide information asymmetry. Although these studies exclusively focuses on
primary offerings, the theory of information asymmetry can be equally applied to secondary
offerings, in that stakeholders liquidating their positions via secondary SEOs may prefer
to sell their own shares when the market is most informed about the fundamental value of
their firms.
I consider the dispersion of abnormal returns around public firms’ earnings
announcements made in quarter t as a proxy for market-wide information asymmetry
prevailing in the corresponding quarter. In practice, I compute the variance of CARi,t for
all firms with earnings announcements in quarter t, where CARi,t is a three-day cumulative
return around each announcement, or equivalently speaking, ∑1d=−1(ri,d−rM,d). Assuming
21
that the magnitude of CARi,t reflects the degree of information asymmetry, Lowry (2003)
claims that the dispersion of CARi,t should be positively related to the degree of market-
wide information asymmetry.4 Unlike Lowry (2003) using the dispersion of CARi,t without
modifications, I extract their innovations by running the AR model of order two on a time-
series of Var[CARi,t ] over the period 3Q 1971 – 4Q 2005, and then computing the estimated
residuals from the AR(2) fit. This is because a time-series of Var[CARi,t ] is persistently
increasing over time, and its first two sample partial autocorrelation coefficients are non-
zero while the rest are insignificantly different from zero. Throughout the paper, I take
the estimated residual in quarter t as a proxy for market-wide information asymmetry in
quarter t, denoted by INFOt .
Among others, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
argue that the expected return is an increasing function of illiquidity, or equivalently
speaking, security price is negatively related to illiquidity. This suggests the possibility
that an issuer maximizing the wealth of stakeholders in events of equity issuance may have
an incentive to conduct an offering when market-wide illiquidity is low so as to minimize
trading costs. As a result, it is predicted that an issuance probability shall be positively
related to liquidity, so long as the concern about low trading costs is material. Like the
SEOs motivated by information asymmetry, one sees that the SEO activity motivated by
liquidity is consistent with the notion of market efficiency.
4As a second proxy for information asymmetry, she computes the dispersion of analysts’ annual earnings
forecasts for all public firms in the IBES database. Table 3 of Lowry (2003), however, shows that this proxy
has a positive coefficient which is insignificant at a 5% level. For this reason, she takes the dispersion
of CARi,t as the sole proxy for information asymmetry throughout her paper. In unreported results, I
have the same observation in the VAR analysis; the dispersion of analysts’ annual earnings forecasts has
a insignificantly positive coefficient in the VAR models on primary and secondary SEO volume. Since the
proxy for information asymmetry should be negatively related to the issuance probability via a channel of
adverse-selection costs of issuing equity, this paper also does not consider the dispersion of analysts’ annual
earnings forecasts as a proxy for information asymmetry.
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For market-wide trading costs, I rely on a price-impact proxy of Amihud (2002) as
a measure of market-wide liquidity in quarter t, denoted by LQDt .5 Following Watanabe
and Watanabe (2007), LQDt is constructed in three steps. First, PRIM j,t is defined as
(1/D j,t)∑
D j,t
d=1 |r j,d,t |/ν j,d,t , where r j,d,t and ν j,d,t are the return and dollar volume of stock
j on day d in quarter t and D j,t is the number of daily observations in quarter t, and is
computed for stock j only if (a) it is ordinary common equity exchanged in NYSE and
AMEX, (b) D j,t is greater than 44, and (c) the beginning-of-the quarter price is between
$5 and $1,000. Next, the aggregate price impact, APRIMt is computed each quarter t as
(1/Kt)∑Ktj=1 PRIM j,t , where Kt is the number of stocks included in quarter t. At the last
step, LQDt is computed as the negative estimated residual from the modified AR(2) model
of APRIMt that is specified in Watanabe and Watanabe (2007).
Finally, the behavioral literature argues that public equity offering can be motivated by
investor sentiment, as asserted by the notion of windows-of-opportunity. With the presence
of temporary mispricing due to a limit on arbitrage, the managerial opportunistic behavior
suggests that a higher level of market-wide mispricing would lead to more offerings aiming
to exploit abnormal profits that are arising during the periods of windows-of-opportunity.
In this paper, a composite index of sentiment, denoted by SENTt , is used to measure
market-wide investor sentiment, which is originally proposed in Baker and Wurgler (2006,
2007). By construction, SENTt is the first principal component of six empirical proxies that
are known to represent the degree of market-wide mispricing, such as the closed-end fund
discount (CEFD), NYSE share turnover (TURN), the number (NIPO) and average first-
day returns (RIPO) on IPOs, the equity share in new issues (S), and the dividend premium
(PDND).
5I appreciate Egemen Genc for providing the data of quarterly LQDs.
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I first construct the quarterly series of these empirical variables, all of which are
available at a monthly frequency in Jeffrey Wurgler’s Website.6 Quarterly CEFDs and
PDNDs are computed as monthly CEFDs and PDNDs recorded in March, June, September,
and December. TURN in quarter t is computed as the average of monthly TURNs in quarter
t. NIPO in quarter t is computed as the sum of monthly NIPOs in quarter t. RIPO in
quarter t is computed as the weighted average of monthly RIPOs in quarter t, where each
monthly RIPO is weighted by a corresponding monthly NIPO. Finally, S in quarter t is
computed as a ratio of the sum of monthly SEs in quarter t to the sum of monthly SEs
plus SDs in quarter t, where SE and SD represent aggregate equity and debt respectively.
Then, I follow the same procedures of Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) and compute the
first principal component of the correlation matrix of six quarterly proxies. As a result, a
composite sentiment index in quarter t is formulated as
SENTt = −0.40CEFDt+0.46TURNt+0.39NIPOt+0.31RIPOt−1
−0.19St−1−0.59PDNDt−1.
Figure 4.1. shows the quarterly time-series of the variables constructed above. Panel
A plots a time-series of primary SEO volume (depicted in a solid line) and that of
secondary SEO volume (depicted in a dotted line), showing that both volume series have
been fluctuated over time and tend to move together; a correlation between primary SEO
volume and secondary SEO volume is 0.56. Interestingly, secondary SEOs have been
conducted frequently prior to the stock market crash of 1987 and started increasing again
since year 2000 that approximately corresponds to the end of the dot-com era. In years
surrounding the stock market crash of 1987, market uncertainty was high in Panel B, market
6I appreciate Jeffrey Wurgler for providing the monthly data of six empirical proxies.
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performance was bad in Panel C, market opinions on fundamentals were severely diverged
in Panel D, and market liquidity was dried up in Panel E, all of which are consistent with
the findings of previous studies on the stock market crash. As a final remark, the quarterly
sentiment index in Panel E is qualitatively as same as the annual index of Baker and Wurgler
(2006) and the monthly index of Baker and Wurgler (2007) over the period 1970 – 2005.
In implementing Equation 4.3., I normalize all variables of yt except for nt for having
zero mean and one standard deviation, making them in comparable units. Panel A of
Table 4.2. reports contemporaneous correlations among five normalized variables of ∆ fˆ–
∆V̂OL, R̂ET, ∆ÎNFO, ∆L̂QD, and ∆ŜENT–along with the p-values from the Pearson
moment tests. There are several notes. First, a positive relation between ∆V̂OL and
∆ÎNFO–greater market uncertainty corresponds to greater information asymmetry–would
be consistent with Chen and Zhao (2009), in that market volatility is driven by unexpected
shocks to future cash flows and information asymmetry–the difference between an insider’s
view on and a market’s view on a firm’s fundamental value–is a main source of the cash
flow shocks.7 Next, ∆L̂QD is negatively related to ∆V̂OL, which is conformable to the
bid-ask determination theory; if market volatility falls, the market-wide illiquidity also
falls because decreasing uncertainty regarding fundamentals reduces the expected costs of
market making. No relation between ∆V̂OL and ∆ŜENT would support Pastor and Veronesi
(2005) viewing that a channel between market volatility and market-wide mispricing is
unclear. A positive relation between ∆L̂QD and R̂ET is anticipated by Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), in that the expected risk premium is a positive, concave function of
illiquidity. ∆ŜENT is positively related to R̂ET, which is not surprising as asserted by the
7An early study by Campbell (1991) argues that market volatility is mainly driven by discount rate news
rather than cash flow news. Chen and Zhao (2006) point out that an omitted-variable bias in a predictive
regression for the expected market risk premium would cause a problem with measuring the discount rate
news. As a result, they claim that Campbell (1991) treating the cash flow news as the residual could make an
incorrect conclusion on the relative importance of discount rate news versus cash flow news.
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FIGURE 4.1.: SEO Volume and Other Empirical Proxies over 1Q 1970 – 4Q 2005
Panel A depicts quarterly primary SEO volume in a solid line and quarterly secondary
SEO volume in a dotted line. Panel B reports quarterly market volatility or VOLt . Panel
C reports quarterly market returns or RETt . Panel D depicts a measure of quarterly
information asymmetry or INFOt . Panel E shows a measure of quarterly liquidity or LQDt .
Finally, Panel F shows a measure of quarterly investor sentiment or SENTt .
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TABLE 4.2.: Correlations and Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)
Panel A reports the contemporaneous correlations among ∆V̂OLt , R̂ETt , ∆ÎNFOt , ∆L̂QDt ,
and ∆ŜENTt . The p-values from the Pearson moment tests are reported in parentheses.
Panel B reports the VIFs in the case that nt is regressing against ∆V̂OLt−1, R̂ETt−1,
∆ÎNFOt−1, ∆L̂QDt−1, and ∆ŜENTt−1.
∆V̂OLt R̂ETt ∆ÎNFOt ∆L̂QDt ∆ŜENTt
Panel A. Correlations
∆V̂OLt -0.43 (0.00) 0.27 (0.00) -0.57 (0.00) 0.01 (0.92)
R̂ETt 0.15(0.08) 0.42 (0.00) 0.17 (0.05)
∆ÎNFOt 0.02 (0.83) -0.19(0.03)
∆L̂QDt -0.17(0.04)
Panel B. Variance Inflation Factors
VIF 1.91 1.64 1.29 1.75 1.19
behavioral literature. Finally, a negative relation of ∆L̂QD with ∆ŜENT is understandable,
in that high liquidity implies low trading costs for implementing the arbitrage strategy
of exploiting temporary mispricing and subsequently leads to low investor sentiment [see,
e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997)]. Overall, I find that the correlations among the variables in
Panel A of Table 4.2. are broadly consistent with the findings of previous studies, and thus
conclude that the variables successfully capture certain dimensions of market conditions
reflecting information asymmetry, liquidity, and investor sentiment.
The strong correlations documented in Panel A of Table 4.2. would indicate that
a problem arising from multicollinearity among variables adversely affects statistical
inferences on estimated coefficients when the variables are used together as a vector of
yt in the VAR model specified in Equation 4.3.–as their correlations becomes stronger, it
becomes more difficult to determine which variables actually influence n. Although it is
not irrefutable to test whether the multicollinearity is really causing a problem in explaining
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n, I compute the variance inflation factors (VIFs) as diagnostic statistics for detecting the
multicollinearity problem in Panel B of Table 4.2..8 When regressing nt against the vector
∆ fˆt−1, Panel B shows that ∆V̂OL has the greatest VIF of 1.91 and implies that, if the
multicollinearity causes a problem, the coefficient on ∆V̂OL is most likely to have an
incorrectly underestimated t-statistic.
More importantly, as argued by Greene (2007), the multicollinearity becomes in
principle problematic when one has a prior belief that bad data is employed in a good
model, where the good model is secured by theory. Among others, a risk-return relation
postulated in the asset pricing literature provides one with a good model implying that R̂ET
is a function of ∆V̂OL or vice versa. Exactly speaking, the risk-return relation states that
the expected market risk premium is functional of conditional market volatility. The ex post
market return has its functional form of the unobservable expected market risk premium.
At the same time, a change in ex post market volatility is also related to the unobservable
conditional market volatility. Consequently, the ex ante risk-return relation argues that
R̂ET shall be related to ∆V̂OL, in that both RET and ∆VOL are empirical proxies for the
unobservable expected market risk premium.
This predicted relationship between R̂ET and ∆V̂OL, implied by the ex ante risk-
return relationship, suggests that the standard error of the estimated coefficient on ∆V̂OL
shall be adversely affected by its functional relation with R̂ET whenever both variables are
used together in a regression of equity issuance. Regardless of any statistical symptoms
indicating how severely the multicollinearity affects the t-statistics of the estimated
coefficients on R̂ET and ∆V̂OL, thus, one would like to avoid the case where R̂ET and
8The VIF for variable bk represents an additional increase in the variance of bk that can be attributable to
the correlation of Xk with other explanatory variables, X−k. The use of the VIFs cannot be refutable since no
theoretical argument is available to judge the threshold value that the VIF is high enough to adversely affect
the variance of estimates.
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∆V̂OL are employed together in a single regression, so long as she believes that the asset
pricing model of risk-return is good a priori [see, e.g., Pastor and Veronesi (2005)].
4.4. Empirical Results
Table 4.3. reports the Granger-causality tests implied by the VAR(p) model fits of
bivariate yt in Panel A and those of trivariate yt in Panel B. For instance, H0 : R̂ET9 n
states the null hypothesis that R̂ET does not Granger-cause n. The Wald statistics, corrected
for heteroskedasticity, are reported along with the corresponding p-values in parentheses.
According to the first two rows of Panel A, R̂ET is useful to predict the issuance probability
of a primary offering, while ∆V̂OL is useful to predict that of a secondary offering. In the
remaining rows, ∆ÎNFO and ∆ŜENT have no predictability for both nP and nS, but ∆L̂QD
Granger-causes both nP and nS. Without considering an omitted-variable bias, Panel A
concludes that timing a SEO significantly differs on the dimensions of R̂ET and ∆V̂OL–
that is to say, an issuer shall time market returns when conducting a primary offering, while
she shall time changes in market volatility when conducting a secondary offering.
The same conclusion is made on the different timing with respect to R̂ET and ∆V̂OL
in Panel B where the predictability is investigated in the trivariate VAR models and thus the
omitted-variable bias would be less problematic relative to Panel A. One sees that ∆V̂OL is
useful to predict the issuance probability of a secondary SEO in all four cases where R̂ET,
∆ÎNFO, ∆L̂QD, and ∆ŜENT are each combined with a pair of ∆V̂OL and n. In contrast,
∆V̂OL is not useful to predict the issuance probability of a primary SEO in any four cases.
Overall, Table 4.3. provides preliminary evidence that the volatility timing, if it is present,
would be prevalent when conducting a secondary SEO.
Before moving to a multivariate VAR analysis, I compute orthogonalized impulse
response functions (IRFs) implied by the bivariate VAR fits in Panel A of Table 4.3., and
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TABLE 4.3.: Granger-causality Tests
This table performs the Granger-causality tests implied by the VAR(p) model that yt =
c+Φ1yt−1+ . . .+Φpyt−p+ εt , where yt = (nt ,∆ fˆMt )
′
, ∆ fˆMt is defined as Zt∆ fMt , and εt ∼
i.i.d.(0,Ω). For instance, H0 : R̂ET9 n states the null that R̂ET does not Granger-cause
n. BIC information criterion is used for selecting p. The Wald statistics, corrected for
heteroskedasticity, are reported along with the corresponding p-values in parentheses.
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs
yt H0 p R2 Wald p R2 Wald
Panel A. Bivariate VARs
(R̂ETt ,nt) R̂ET9 n 3 0.65 31.91 1 0.53 3.61
(0.00) (0.06)
(∆V̂OLt ,nt) ∆V̂OL9 n 2 0.55 4.20 1 0.54 12.23
(0.12) (0.00)
(∆ÎNFOt ,nt) ∆ÎNFO9 n 3 0.57 1.88 3 0.50 6.38
(0.60) (0.09)
(∆L̂QDt ,nt) ∆L̂QD9 n 5 0.68 33.74 3 0.57 9.76
(0.00) (0.02)
(∆ŜENTt ,nt) ∆ŜENT9 n 1 0.50 0.17 1 0.52 3.13
(0.68) (0.08)
Panel B. Trivariate VARs
(R̂ETt ,∆V̂OLt ,nt) R̂ET9 n 1 0.54 3.53 1 0.54 0.63
(0.06) (0.43)
∆V̂OL9 n 0.44 7.19
(0.51) (0.01)
(∆ÎNFOt ,∆V̂OLt ,nt) ∆ÎNFO9 n 3 0.60 1.65 3 0.54 3.93
(0.65) (0.27)
∆V̂OL9 n 2.85 8.25
(0.42) (0.04)
(∆L̂QDt ,∆V̂OLt ,nt) ∆L̂QD9 n 3 0.63 8.89 2 0.57 4.51
(0.03) (0.11)
∆V̂OL9 n 0.94 5.97
(0.82) (0.05)
(∆ŜENTt ,∆V̂OLt ,nt) ∆ŜENT9 n 1 0.52 0.18 1 0.55 3.30
(0.67) (0.07)
∆V̂OL9 n 2.78 10.04
(0.10) (0.00)
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examine how the causal impact of an innovation to explanatory variable x, denoted by ηx,
affects a future issuance probability. For this task, the recursive causal ordering is restricted
that x→ n; in words, x affects n, but n does not affect x.
Figure 4.2. reports orthogonalized IRFs of n with respect to orthogonalized shocks to
R̂ET, ∆V̂OL, ∆ÎNFO, ∆L̂QD, and ∆ŜENT respectively. The IRFs of primary SEOs are
depicted in solid lines and those of secondary SEOs are depicted in dotted lines. There are
two things worth mentioning. First, the IRFs are consistent with the theoretical arguments
on how each variable shall be related to an issuance probability. In response to the structural
shock to R̂ET, for instance, Panel A plots that n jumps immediately and then gradually
decreases to zero thereafter. This positive effect is anticipated by the positive effect of price
run-up on an issuance probability. The effects of η∆INFO, η∆LQD, and η∆SENT in Panels C,
D, and E are all consistent with the theoretical predictions on their roles in describing an
issuance activity; an issuance probability will increase if information asymmetry falls or
liquidity increases or investor sentiment increases.
Next, Panel B graphically illustrates that the shock to ∆V̂OL negatively influences an
issuance probability. Interestingly, the effect of volatility shocks on an issuance probability
is stronger in secondary SEOs than in primary SEOs; the change in nS due to the market
volatility shocks is almost twice in magnitude as big as that of nP. In contrast, the remaining
panels show that the structural shocks to other determinants affect almost equally the
issuance probabilities of both types of offerings. Thus, Panel B of Figure 4.2. strengthens
the findings of Table 4.3., concluding that market volatility shocks are more influential in
making a secondary SEO rather than a primary SEO.
Table 4.4. performs the multivariate VAR models and reports the equations for nt .
The t-statistics, given in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. In column
(1) where yt is defined as a vector of R̂ETt , ∆V̂OLt , ∆ÎNFOt , ∆L̂QDt , ∆ŜENTt , and
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FIGURE 4.2.: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)
This figure plots orthogonalized IRFs from the bivariate VAR(p) model fits specified
in Panel A of Table 4.3.. The initial ordering condition states that x → n, where x ∈{
R̂ET,∆V̂OL,∆ÎNFO,∆L̂QD,∆ŜENT
}
. Panel A plots ∂nt+h/∂ηRET, where ηRET is an
orthogonal shock to R̂ETt . Panel B plots ∂nt+h/∂ηVOL, where ηVOL is an orthogonal shock
to ∆V̂OLt . Panel C plots ∂nt+h/∂ηINFO, where ηINFO is an orthogonal shock to ∆ÎNFOt .
Panel D plots ∂nt+h/∂ηLQD, where ηLQD is an orthogonal shock to ∆L̂QDt . Finally, Panel
E plots ∂nt+h/∂ηSENT, where ηSENT is an orthogonal shock to ∆ŜENTt . The IRFs are
depicted in solid and dotted lines for primary and secondary SEOs respectively.
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nS,t , the proxy for investor sentiment has a significantly negative coefficient at a 10%
level, meaning that lagged investor sentiment is negatively related to the current issuance
probability of a secondary SEO. This apparently counter-intuitive behavior regarding
investor sentiment would be consistent with no post-issue abnormal performance of
secondary SEO-conducting firms in Panel B of Table 2.1., in that an issuer seems to time a
secondary offering when investor sentiment is decreasing and, as a result, secondary shares
are sold at prices that are getting close to their fundamental values. As shall be shown
in columns (3) and (4), this negative coefficient on ∆ŜENTt−1 remains significant in the
various equations for nS,t . To my best knowledge, no theory is available to predict this
inverse relation between investor sentiment and the issuance probability of a secondary
SEO.
Next, column (1) shows that the estimated coefficient on ∆V̂OLt−1 is negative but
insignificant at a 10% level. If column (1) would be free from the multicollinearity problem,
one could conclude that secondary SEOs are rarely motivated by pre-issue dynamics of
market volatility. As discussed above, however, the multicollinearity among explanatory
variables could cause a statistical problem in column (1) where R̂ETt−1 and ∆V̂OLt−1 are
used together, and thus the t-statistic of the estimated coefficient on ∆V̂OLt−1 would be
underestimated, although the estimated coefficient is unbiasedly negative. I shall cope with
the potential multicollinearity problem in remaining columns.
Concerning that the multicollinearity could matter to some extent in column (1), I first
rely on an underfitting approach by dropping either R̂ET or ∆V̂OL in a regression equation
for n in the VAR setting. Although it is the most common remedy for the multicollinearity
problem, however, the underfitting causes the omitted-variable bias unless a discarded
variable is not related to retained variables or has no explanatory power for a dependent
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TABLE 4.4.: Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Analysis
This table reports various equations for nt in the VAR(p) fits for nP,t and nS,t , where nP,t
and nS,t are defined as the logarithm of primary and secondary SEO volume respectively.
In columns, PrinCompt is defined as the first principal component of a vector of R̂ETt ,
∆ÎNFOt , and ∆L̂QDt . BIC information criterion is used for selecting p. The t-statistics,
reported in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
(1) nS,t (2) nS,t (3) nS,t (4) nS,t (5) nP,t (6) nP,t (7) nP,t (8) nP,t
Intercept 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.58 1.19 0.79 1.19 1.15
(3.58) (3.41) (3.70) (3.71) (4.69) (2.59) (4.82) (4.64)
R̂ETt−1 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.10
(0.99) (1.36) (2.32) (2.18)
∆V̂OLt−1 -0.05 -0.14 -0.11 0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(-0.62) (-2.04) (-1.79) (0.55) (-0.47) (-0.54)
∆ÎNFOt−1 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.03 -0.09
(-1.58) (-0.19) (-2.03) (-2.14) (-0.66) (-2.19)
∆L̂QDt−1 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.05
(1.19) (1.08) (1.84) (1.76) (1.92) (1.49)
∆ŜENTt−1 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.00
(-1.79) (-1.56) (-1.85) (-1.75) (-0.81) (0.56) (-0.81) (0.00)
PrinCompt−1 -0.07 -0.07
(-1.34) (-1.60)
nt−1 0.71 0.65 0.71 0.73 0.68 0.54 0.68 0.70
(10.02) (6.16) (10.24) (11.85) (10.30) (6.60) (10.59) (10.74)
∆V̂OLt−2 -0.13 -0.02
(-1.77) (-0.44)
∆ÎNFOt−2 0.11 0.02
(1.40) (0.44)
∆L̂QDt−2 -0.01 0.03
(-0.14) (0.44)
∆ŜENTt−2 -0.04 0.03
(-0.71) (0.58)
nt−2 0.07 0.25
(0.71) (2.34)
R2 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.54
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variable.9 Note that the underfitting does not induce the omitted-variable bias, so long as
the risk-return relation is true a priori and a correct model of equity issuance consists of the
expected market risk premium. Put differently, the omitted-variable bias matters to some
extent in the underfitting analysis only when one believes that the correct model of equity
issuance consists of both R̂ET and ∆V̂OL, or equivalently speaking, R̂ET and ∆V̂OL have
distinct roles in explaining the motivation behind SEOs.
I drop R̂ET in column (2) but ∆V̂OL in column (3). Column (3) shows that the
estimated coefficient on R̂ETt−1 is insignificantly different from zero at a 10% level,
meaning that price run-up has no effect on the issuance probability of a secondary SEO.
Recalling that the market-wide capital demands are proxied by R̂ET, no explanatory power
of R̂ET in column (3) is understandable by the fact that secondary offerings do not intend
to raise external capitals for initiating new projects. Without taking into account the
volatility timing, column (3) finds that a secondary SEO-issuing firm seems to emphasize
decreasing information asymmetry, increasing liquidity, and decreasing investor sentiment–
the estimated coefficients on ∆ÎNFOt−1, ∆L̂QDt−1, and ∆ŜENTt−1 are all significant at a
10% level.
The insignificant coefficient on R̂ETt−1 is interesting in a statistical sense. When the
correct model requires both R̂ET and ∆V̂OL, one would be concerned about the omitted
variable bias in column (3). Given a trade-off between the precision of estimation and the
omitted-variable bias, it is known that the estimated coefficient on R̂ETt−1 is more precise
than that in column (1) on a basis of the mean-squared error (MSE) criterion [see, e.g.,
Greene (2007)]. Although it would be biased, therefore, the insignificant coefficient on
R̂ETt−1 in column (3) concludes that the correct model explaining a secondary SEO does
9Suppose that a model is correctly specified in a regression that y = X1β1 +X2β2. Greene (2007) shows
that running y on X1 without including X2 results in E[b1] = β1+P12β2, where P12 = (X
′
1X1)
−1X ′1X2. Thus,
it is easy to see that b1 is unbiased if X
′
1X2 = 0 or β2 = 0.
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not include R̂ET, so that the estimated coefficients in column (2) where R̂ET is dropped
are rarely subject to the omitted-variable bias.10
The VAR(2) fit of nS,t in column (2) shows that both ∆V̂OLt−1 and ∆V̂OLt−2 have
significantly negative coefficients at a 10% level, meaning that the issuance probability of
a secondary SEO is increasing with decreasing pre-issue market volatility. In addition,
column (2) finds that the concern about market volatility, materialized in the coefficients
on ∆V̂OL, dominates other determinants of information asymmetry, liquidity, and investor
sentiment, none of which has a significant coefficient at a 10% level. Put differently,
the motivation for pre-issue market volatility largely explains the issuance decision of a
secondary SEO in which stakeholders are about to liquidate their positions that are locked
by initial investments at start-up. This volatility timing in secondary SEOs is new and
puzzling, thus giving a theorist an intellectual challenge to come up with a rational model
reconciling it.
For examining the issuance decision of primary SEOs, I repeat the same exercises in
columns (5) to (7) by replacing nS with nP. In column (5) where both R̂ET and ∆V̂OL
are included in a regression of nP, I find that R̂ETt−1, ∆ÎNFOt−1, and ∆L̂QDt−1 have
statistically significant coefficients at a 10% level. In words, the issuance probability of a
primary SEO is affected by price run-up, information asymmetry, and liquidity. No role
of investor sentiment in primary SEOs seems to contradict Lowry (2003) who claims that
primary IPOs are partly motivated by investor sentiment.
Concerning the potential multicollinearity problem in column (5), the underfitting
analysis is performed in column (6) where R̂ET is dropped and in column (7) where ∆V̂OL
is dropped. Column (6) shows that ∆V̂OL has statistically insignificant coefficients at
a 10% level in the VAR(2) model of primary SEOs. Thus, the volatility timing is not
10In other words, it is equivalent to the case where β2 = 0 when a correct model is stated as y=X1β1+X2β2.
Thus, running y on X1 without including X2 results in E[b1] = β1, implying that an estimate of β1 is unbiased.
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observed in selling new equity. Since the estimated coefficients on ∆V̂OL in column (6)
are more precise than the corresponding one in column (5) on a basis of the MSE criterion,
no volatility timing in column (6) implies that ∆V̂OL is not included in the correct model
for nP, and thus that the estimated coefficients in column (7) are largely free from the
omitted-variable bias.
In column (7), the positive coefficient on R̂ETt−1 concludes that a primary offering is
made in accordance with the price run-up. In addition, column (7) shows that information
asymmetry is significantly determining the issuance probability of a primary offering,
which is consistent with the notion of adverse-selection costs of issuing equity. Neither
liquidity nor investor sentiment explains the issuance probability of a primary SEO. In
particular, no explanatory power of investor sentiment conforms to the finding of DeAngelo
et al. (2010) that primary SEOs are mainly motivated for a near-term cash need for normal
operation rather than exploiting abnormal profits from selling new shares in the periods of
high investor sentiment.
As the second remedy for the potential multicollinearity problem in columns (1) and
(5), I reduce the dimension of explanatory variables using the first principal component,
denoted by PrinComp, computed from a set of explanatory variables, and then aim to
relieve the multicollinearity among the variables. The first row of Panel A of Table 4.2.
informs that a set of R̂ET, ∆ÎNFO and ∆L̂QD is a good candidate for computing PrinComp,
in that each variable is strongly correlated with ∆V̂OL and collectively affects the standard
error of the estimated coefficient on ∆V̂OL in an adverse manner.11
In columns (4) and (8) of Table 4.4., I compute the first principal component of R̂ET,
∆ÎNFO, and ∆L̂QD spanned over the period 1Q 1970 – 4Q 2005, and reduce the dimension
11Additionally, I compute PrinComp among two different pairs, such as a pair of R̂ET and ∆ÎNFO and
a pair of R̂ET and ∆L̂QD. I find that the main results of this paper remain unchanged when these different
PrinComps are used. The results are available upon request.
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of explanatory variables by two. The VAR models augmented with the first principal
component show that the negative coefficient on ∆V̂OLt−1 is significant at a 10% level
when making a secondary SEO in column (4), but is insignificantly different from zero
when making a primary SEO, as documented in column (8). Consistent with columns (2)
and (6), therefore, I conclude that the pre-issue volatility does matter only when issuing
firms sell existing shares.
While Table 4.4. investigates if the pre-issue volatility is related to making a SEO,
I now examine if an issuance decision is useful to predict changes in post-issue market
volatility since the volatility finding of Carlson et al. (2010), as reproduced in Panel C of
Figure 3.1., suggest that, on average, an issuer seems to predict increasing market volatility
after issuance. Similarly, Panels A and B of Figure 3.1. suggest that the current issuance
probability could be positively related to ∆VOLt+1–in words, more SEOs are conducted
before market volatility is increasing, while less SEOs are otherwise. For the Granger-
causality of n for ∆V̂OL, I report the equations for ∆V̂OL in Table 4.5..
In column (1) where yt is defined as a vector of R̂ETt , ∆V̂OLt , ∆ÎNFOt , ∆L̂QDt ,
∆ŜENTt , and nP,t , I find little evidence of the Granger causality of primary SEO volume for
∆V̂OL. Similarly, the estimated coefficients of n are all statistically insignificant at a 10%
level in column (2) where R̂ETt is dropped and in column (3) where R̂ETt , ∆ÎNFOt , and
∆L̂QDt are replaced with PrinCompt . Thus, columns (1) to (3) conclude that the issuance
probability of primary SEOs is not useful to predict changes in future market volatility. I
perform the same exercises for secondary SEOs in columns (4) to (6) by replacing nP,t with
nS,t . Except for that of nt−2 in column (5), all estimated coefficient on n are statistically
insignificant at a 10% level.12 Thus, the Granger-causality of secondary SEO volume for
∆V̂OL is also weak at best. Overall, Table 4.5. concludes that the equity issuance decision
12The Wald statistic of testing for H0 : n9 ∆V̂OL in column (5) is 5.17 with the p-value of 0.08.
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TABLE 4.5.: Equations for ∆V̂OL in the VAR(p) Model
This table reports the equations for ∆V̂OL in the VAR(p) model for primary and secondary
SEOs. BIC information criterion is used for selecting p. The t-statistics, reported in
parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -0.81 -0.82 -0.74 -0.29 -0.33 -0.28
(-0.83) (-0.99) (-0.74) (-0.60) (-0.80) (-0.60)
R̂ETt−1 -0.00 0.01
(-0.02) (0.08)
∆V̂OLt−1 -0.45 -0.67 -0.41 -0.45 -0.69 -0.42
(-0.95) (-1.76) (-0.90) (-0.94) (-1.79) (-0.91)
∆ÎNFOt−1 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.23
(0.83) (1.72) (0.79) (1.85)
∆L̂QDt−1 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02
(0.52) (0.16) (0.41) (0.12)
∆ŜENTt−1 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.05
(0.65) (1.22) (0.46) (0.65) (1.43) (0.55)
PrinCompt−1 -0.07 -0.05
(-0.66) (-0.49)
nt−1 0.21 -0.11 0.20 0.14 -0.10 0.13
(0.89) (-0.31) (0.80) (0.71) (-0.61) (0.70)
∆V̂OLt−2 -0.48 -0.50
(-1.33) (-1.43)
∆ÎNFOt−2 0.21 0.22
(1.65) (1.70)
∆L̂QDt−2 -0.20 -0.21
(-1.59) (-1.53)
∆ŜENTt−2 0.05 0.05
(0.52) (0.50)
nt−2 0.33 0.71 0.26
(0.97) (1.92)
R2 0.23 0.35 0.23 0.23 0.36 0.22
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of primary and secondary SEOs has nothing to do with the dynamics of post-issue market
volatility.
Finally, expected volatility could provide an additional insight on the volatility timing
of SEOs by investigating whether or not a firm times an offering on a basis of a forward-
looking view on market volatility. Up to this point, the volatility timing is addressed in
terms of a backward-looking view on market volatility–that is to say, ex post variance in
time t is treated as an ex ante unbiased estimate of variance in time t+ 1. It is, however,
known that market volatility exhibits time varying conditional heteroskedasticity–high
volatility is followed by high volatility, and low volatility is followed by low volatility–and
this volatility clustering has been widely studied by econometricians since an impressive
study by Engle (1982). Considering this non-random walk process of market volatility, one
can postulate that issuers would time equity offerings with respect to the expected market
volatility conditional on all information available up to time t, denoted by Et [VOLt+1].
For this exercise, I construct a time-series of estimates of Et [VOLt+1] using a model-
free approach and a model of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(GARCH) respectively. I obtain the VIX index over the period 1990 – 2005 from the
Chicago Board Options Exchange, and take it as an estimate for the conditional market
volatility. Recall that the VIX index in time t measures the risk-neutral expected variance
in time t+1 on a basis of the S&P 500 index options along with the model-free approach
[see, e.g., Bollerslev et al. (2009)].13 Alternatively, I choose the GARCH(1, 1) model of
Bollerslev (1986) for estimating the conditional market volatility. Following French et al.
13The performance of the implied volatility in terms of its ability to predict future ex post volatility is well
studied. For instance, Fleming (1998) finds that although VIXt is an upwardly biased forecast of VOLt+1,
its forecast power dominates that of VOLt . Day and Lewis (1990), Harvey and Whaely (1992), etc conclude
that the implied volatility contains relevant information on future ex post volatility. By contrast, Canina
and Figlewski (1993) conclude that VIXt is an inefficient and biased forecast of VOLt+1 by showing no
correlation between VIXt and VOLt+1.
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(1987), I use the full period data of quarterly market returns on CRSP VW index from the
period 1Q 1965 – 4Q 2009 for estimating the conditional market volatility.
Table 4.6. reports the equations for nt in various VAR fits augmented with ∆V̂IXt
or ∆ĜARCHt , where ∆V̂IXt and ∆ĜARCHt is defined as Zt∆VIXt and Zt∆GARCHt
respectively. In column (1), the estimated coefficient on ∆V̂IXt−1 is insignificantly different
from zero when yt is a vector of ∆V̂IXt , ∆ÎNFOt , ∆L̂QDt , ∆ŜENTt , and nS,t . No
explanatory power of ∆V̂IX is observed in column (2) in which yt is defined as a vector of
∆V̂IXt , PrinComp1t , ∆ŜENTt , and nS,t , where PrinComp1t is the first principal component
of R̂ETt , ∆ÎNFOt , and ∆L̂QDt computed over the period 1Q 1990 – 4Q 2005. Similarly,
columns (3) and (4) find no explanatory power of the conditional market volatility when
the estimates from the GARCH(1, 1) model are adopted instead of the VIX index. Thus,
columns (1) to (4) conclude that the expected volatility is not related to the issuance
probability of a secondary SEO that have been conducted over the period 1Q 1990 – 4Q
2005. In columns (5) and (6), I repeat the similar VAR analysis using a time-series of the
GARCH estimates starting from the period 2Q 1972, and find no evidence of explanatory
power of ∆ĜARCH for the longer sample periods. Thus, no relation between the issuance
probability and the conditional market volatility is not period-specific, so long as GARCHt
is taken as a correct estimate of the conditional volatility. From columns (7) to (9), none
of estimated coefficients on ∆V̂IX and ∆ĜARCH is significant in explaining the issuance
probability of a primary SEO. Overall, I do find little evidence that a public equity offering
is influenced by the dynamics of conditional market volatility prior to issuance.
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TABLE 4.6.: VAR Analysis with the VIX index and the GARCH Estimates
This table reports the equations for nt in the VAR(p) fits for SEO volume. As estimates of conditional market volatility, VIXt
is the VIX index in quarter t over the period 1Q 1990 – 4Q 2005 and GARCHt is an estimate in quarter t from the GARCH(1, 1) fit on
quarterly returns over the period 1Q 1965 – 4Q 2009. PrinComp1t and PrinComp
2
t are the first principal components of R̂ETt , ∆ ̂INFOt , and
∆L̂QDt over the period 1Q 1990 – 4Q 2005 and the period 1Q 1970 – 4Q 2005 respctively. BIC information criterion is used for selecting
p. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
(1) nS,t (2) nS,t (3) nS,t (4) nS,t (5) nS,t (6) nS,t (7) nP,t (8) nP,t (9) nP,t
Intercept 0.61 0.71 0.61 0.69 0.57 0.57 1.20 1.35 0.99
(2.05) (2.53) (2.05) (2.35) (3.36) (3.46) (2.79) (3.09) (4.28)
∆V̂IXt−1 0.02 0.04 0.08
(0.28) (0.36) (1.20)
∆ ̂GARCHt−1 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.03
(0.21) (0.63) (0.66) (1.06) (-1.03) (-0.79)
∆ ̂INFOt−1 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07
(-1.54) (-1.50) (-1.53) (-1.22) (-1.66) (-1.95)
∆L̂QDt−1 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.11
(1.98) (2.21) (2.12) (1.93) (1.52) (2.99)
∆ ̂SENTt−1 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(-1.64) (-1.75) (-1.56) (-1.78) (-1.55) (-1.75) (-0.32) (-0.56) (-0.03)
PrinComp1t−1 -0.07 -0.04
(-0.96) (-0.73)
PrinComp2t−1 -0.10
(-2.04)
nt−1 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.74
(5.78) (5.82) (5.82) (5.59) (10.59) (11.22) (6.36) (5.99) (12.01)
R2 0.521 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.49 0.55
Starting Period 2Q 1990 2Q 1990 2Q 1990 2Q 1990 2Q 1972 2Q 1972 2Q 1990 2Q 1990 2Q 1972
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Motivated by the volatility dynamics around SEOs of Carlson et al. (2010), this
paper rigorously investigates if an issuance probability is related to changes in either
pre- or post-issue market volatility. Rather than relying on the unobservable firm-level
issuance probability, I use SEO volume to examine the issuance decision of primary and
secondary SEOs with respect to the volatility dynamics in a VAR setting controlling for
the complex lead-lag relations among potential determinants of equity issuance and SEO
volume. Finally, I cope with the multicollinearity problem to some extent by means of an
underfitting and a principal component analysis.
I find some evidence that an issuance probability is negatively related to recent
changes in pre-issue market volatility in events of secondary SEOs in which initial
shareholders liquidate their positions by selling a block of their own shares. In contrast, the
same is not observed in events of primary SEOs in which new shares are sold for raising
external capitals and initiating new, profitable projects. For both types of offerings, I find
little evidence that SEOs predict changes in post-issue market volatility.
The observations of this paper are new and should be interesting. First of all, this
paper provides counter-evidence that the volatility-timing puzzle of Carlson et al. (2010)
is in fact not puzzling. According to their real option-based model of primary SEOs in
Carlson et al. (2006, 2010), the risk of primary SEO-issuing firms shall be increasing prior
to issuance and decreasing thereafter since growth options generate riskier cash flows than
existing assets up to the moment when the options are exercised by means of primary
SEOs. Consistent with this prediction, Carlson et al. (2010) find that beta estimated
from the conditional CAPM is monotonically increasing prior to issuance and decreasing
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thereafter. At the same time, however, they document that the dynamics of event-time
EW average of market volatility contradict the risk dynamics of primary SEOs–on average
market volatility displayed by primary SEOs is decreasing before issuance and increasing
thereafter. Concerning the volatility dynamics, this paper finds little evidence that primary
SEOs are significantly related to the changes in pre- and post-issue market volatility. Put
differently, this finding reconciles the volatility finding of Carlson et al. (2010) with the
real option-based model of primary SEOs in Carlson et al. (2006), in that the volatility
dynamics are not relevant to the issuance decision of selling new equity.
Given limited understanding of economic determinants relating to issuing a secondary
SEO, this paper provides an interesting finding that the issuance decision of a secondary
SEO seems to account for recent changes in pre-issue market volatility. Furthermore,
when the dynamics of pre-issue market volatility is considered as the motivation behind
secondary SEOs, none of other well-known determinants such as information asymmetry,
trading costs, or investor sentiment remains significant in explaining the secondary SEO
issuance decision. To my best knowledge, no theory is available to predict an ex ante
relation of the issuance decision of secondary SEOs with the changes in pre-issue market
volatility, so that the documented volatility timing in secondary SEOs is puzzling and gives
a theorist an intellectual challenge.
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APPENDIX
DERIVATION OF EQUATION 4.2.
This appendix derives Equation 4.2.. Recall first that E[Nt+1] =∑Zti=1 pi,t+1. Summing
Equation 4.1. in the cross section over i= 1, . . . ,Zt , I have
E[Nt+1] =
Zt
∑
i=1
αi+∆ fMt
Zt
∑
i=1
β
′
i (Equation A.1.)
for t = 1, . . . ,T . Note that a left-hand side of Equation A.1. no longer includes the
unobservable pi,t+1. I assume that Nt ∼ AR(l) and write that Nt − µ = φ1(Nt−1− µ)+
· · ·+φl(Nt−l−µ)+ηt , where µ = E[Nt ] and ηt is a white noise. Then, Equation A.1. can
be written as
Nt+1 = A0+Zt∆ fMt
(
1
Zt
Zt
∑
i=1
β
′
i
)
+
l
∑
k=1
φkNt−k+1+ηt , (Equation A.2.)
where A0 ≡ ∑Zti=1αi+µ∑lk=1φk.
From Equation A.2., one can see that the marginal impact of Zt∆ fMt on Nt+1 is
(1/Zt)∑Zti=1β
′
i or the cross-sectional mean value of β
′
i of Equation 4.1.. By running
Equation A.2. for t = 1, . . . ,T , as a result, one gets the estimated cross-sectional mean
value of β ′i , or equivalently speaking, βˆ
′ . Put differently, a relationship of SEO volume
with changes in market-wide determinants, multiplied by Zt , effectively reflects a cross-
sectional average of firm-specific relations of pi,t+1 with ∆ fMt .
It would be instructive to know how Equation A.2. is different from other empirical
specification of previous studies utilizing issuance volume. For instance, Lowry (2003)
examines which market-wide factors lead to IPO volume fluctuation, and runs the following
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regression
Nt+1
Zt
= α+∆ fMt γ+φk
Nt
Zt−1
+ εt+1, (Equation A.3.)
where a vector fMt includes several proxies for market-wide capital demands, information
asymmetry, and investor sentiment.1 Treating Nt as nonstationary, she employs a deflated
time-series of IPO volume in time t by Zt−1 or the number of all public firms on the CRSP
file in time t−1.
Given her own purpose to explain the IPO volume fluctuation, the coefficient on ∆ fMt
or γ in Equation A.3. sufficiently captures the sensitivity of the IPO volume, deflated by
Zt , to the changes in market factors fMt . At the same time, however, the coefficient γ is
not proper to draw an inference on the sensitivity of an issuance probability pi,t+1 to ∆ fMt .
Furthermore, γ can be represented as a functional form of ∑Zti=1β
′
i using a property of the
Bernoulli distribution of Yi,t+1. This means that the information captured in γ approximates
the cross-sectional sum of β ′i in Equation 4.1.. Differently, the coefficient on Zt∆ fˆMt in
Equation A.2. represents the cross-sectional average of β ′i , which is more appropriate to
the purpose of this paper investigating how the firm-level issuance decision is on average
affected by changes in market-wide determinants.
1According to Tables 2 and 3 of Lowry (2003), ∆ fMt in Equation A.3. consists of (a) capital demand
proxies–a change in the number of new firms, a future sales growth, a future GDP growth, a future investment
growth, and a NBER expansion dummy, (b) information asymmetry proxies–a change in the dispersion of
abnormal returns around earnings announcements and a change in the dispersion of analyst forecasts, and
(c) investor sentiment proxies–future EW market returns and a discount on closed-end funds. Except for the
NBER expansion dummy that is qualitative, one sees that all quantitative proxies have forms of changes or
growths.
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